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1. Introduction 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) provide valuable functions in assessing credit risk and in 
financial market development (e.g. Coffee, 2006; Bank of England, 2011). However, “hard-
wiring”1 and “cliff effects”2 of credit rating signals have been under scrutiny during the 
global financial crisis (International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2010; Bank of England, 2011). In 
response, rating-based rules and guidelines have been under consideration to be dismissed 
(e.g. US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 2011a, b), and a new CRA regulation 
regime has been established in the European Union (EU).   
This paper investigates the interaction between sovereign rating news and the equity 
index option market. This market is typically inhabited by institutional informed traders (see 
Chakravarty et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2005; Jin et al., 2012). Much literature identifies that the 
derivative markets play a leading role in the price discovery process (e.g. Blanco et al., 2005; 
Acharya and Johnson, 2007; Avino et al., 2013). Therefore, the dynamics of derivative 
markets can provide important information regarding the credit quality of underlying entities. 
In 2011, the turnover of equity index options traded on organised exchanges over the world 
was US$ 166 trillion (Bank for International Settlements, 2012). The equity index option 
market is the second largest segment of exchange-traded financial derivative markets, after 
interest rate derivatives. Given the prominence of both derivative markets and CRAs, 
interesting questions about the interaction between the index option market and credit rating 
actions can be raised. Such investigations must also consider CRAs’ ‘through the cycle’ 
rating philosophy, which implies that credit ratings are stable and possibly lag behind option 
market indicators.3  
                                                          
1 Credit ratings are embedded into regulations and investment mandates thus making them more influential. 
2 Sudden difficulties caused by rating downgrades because many market participants are forced to sell-off 
securities that are downgraded below certain rating thresholds. 
3 Outlook and watch procedures are expected to alleviate the lag to some extent because they help CRAs to 
avoid rating reversals and to mitigate the tension between rating accuracy and rating stability.  
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Volatility is of crucial interest to institutional investors who hold large international 
diversified portfolios. In terms of economic mechanisms, this paper’s analysis is motivated 
by prior literature on the links between sovereign credit risk and the corporate and financial 
sectors’ overall risk, equity market performance and uncertainty (e.g. Arellano, 2008; 
Acharya et al., 2014; Bedendo and Colla, 2013; Borensztein et al., 2013; Gennaioli et al., 
2014). This is discussed further in Section 2.2. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior investigation of the relationship between 
credit ratings and option markets. We address a gap in knowledge about the relative 
information content from the two sources. Moreover, we demonstrate the importance of 
sovereign rating information in the context of first-mover as well as additional rating signals. 
Several robustness checks are performed using non-parametric approaches and Monte Carlo 
experiments. The paper highlights differences in rating policy and varying influence of rating 
signals from the largest three CRAs, namely Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. 
The main findings are summarised as follows. Firstly, sovereign rating news has a 
significant impact on the option market in various respects depending on the type of news 
and across CRAs. Secondly, there is strong evidence of causality between movements in the 
option market and all types of rating signals from S&P and Fitch, but only actual rating 
changes from Moody’s, thus highlighting differences in rating policies. Moreover, the market 
reactions to S&P and Moody’s signals infer that additional ratings are still informative and 
help reduce market uncertainty. Such results shed light on the price (credit information) 
discovery process. Finally, the findings contribute to the debate surrounding the regulation of 
CRAs and their ratings. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews related 
literature, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 discusses the research hypotheses and 
methodologies, Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1. Credit ratings and regulation 
The rating industry performs a gate-keeping role for international capital markets (e.g. 
Coffee, 2006). Issuers seek ratings to improve the marketability of their financial obligations, 
and/or to increase their trustworthiness to business counterparties. Investors use ratings as a 
cost-effective indicator of securities’ credit risk. Credit ratings provide three essential 
economic functions: information production, monitoring, and certification. Firstly, CRAs 
mitigate the fundamental adverse selection problem between borrowers and investors. 
Through the gathering and analysis of data relating to creditworthiness, CRAs mitigate 
informational asymmetry and adverse selection problems, decrease the risk premium of a 
debt issue, and hence increase the liquidity of assets (Bank of England, 2011).  
Secondly, rating-based guidelines and rules perform a monitoring role and mitigate 
principal-agent problems. Moreover, by signalling a potential downgrade via negative 
outlooks or watch lists, CRAs also encourage an issuer to improve its creditworthiness (IMF, 
2010). To the extent that investors respond to rating changes by adjusting their portfolios, 
such negative rating announcements impose the implicit threat on issuers that failure to act 
will degrade their ability to refinance in the future.  
Thirdly, CRAs provide a certification function for fund managers, regulators, central 
banks, and other market participants in distinguishing between securities with different risk 
characteristics, and specifying terms and conditions in financial contracts (IMF, 2010). 
Examples of credit ratings’ certification function can be found in many aspects of 
investments (e.g. Cantor et al., 2007). The certification function is found in regulatory capital 
requirements for insurance firms (Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Coffee, 2006), commercial 
banks and other financial institutions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011), and 
in the US SEC’s regulatory references (see SEC 2011a, b).  
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The fact that credit ratings have been “hard-wired” into regulations has widened their 
influence. Regulators use credit ratings to restrict public managed funds to invest in debts 
below certain levels of credit ratings, usually the investment-speculative threshold. The 
motivations for using credit ratings as an instrument for market regulation are: (i) aiming at 
financial soundness via establishing prudential minimum credit quality for portfolio holdings 
(e.g. IMF, 2010; White, 2010); (ii) encouraging a minimum credit quality of securities 
issuance to protect investors (e.g. Coffee, 2006).  
CRAs have faced extensive scrutiny for being too lax in rating structured securities, and 
this is widely regarded as a contributing factor to the US subprime crisis (e.g. White, 2010; 
Bank of England, 2011). In response, several regulatory proposals to monitor CRAs have 
been approved or are under consideration, while rating-based rules and guidelines have been 
under consideration to be dismissed. Many G-20 countries have introduced or are in the 
process of implementing new regulatory changes on CRAs (Bank of England, 2011). In the 
US, the Dodd-Frank Act requires thorough revisions of the role of credit ratings in the US 
regulatory framework. For instance, in March and April 2011, SEC proposed amendments 
removing references to credit ratings in the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which are the legal backbone of the US financial system 
(SEC, 2011a, b). In November 2012, one rule, which regulates Business and Industrial 
Development companies who operate under state statutes, among six proposals in SEC 
(2011a) was adopted. As at March 2014, the remaining proposals are still under consideration 
and have not been legally approved.  
CRAs are also accused of precipitating the EU sovereign debt crisis by issuing multiple 
downgrades on Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy. Politicians in the EU have called 
for further regulation to improve quality and transparency in sovereign ratings. Since 2012, 
all CRAs operating in Europe are required to register with the European Securities and 
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Markets Authority and to observe demanding rules which incorporate the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions’ Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating 
Agencies (revised in 2008). 
 
2.2. Economic and market impact of sovereign ratings 
Prior literature shows that sovereign credit risk can spill-over to corporate and financial 
sectors, cross-border investments, and the national economy in numerous ways. Arellano 
(2008) shows that a sovereign default triggers significant surges in the volatilities of interest 
rates, consumption and output. Borensztein el al. (2013) and Bedendo and Colla (2013) show 
that corporate credit risk and borrowing costs are strongly correlated with the evolution of 
sovereign credit risk. Bedendo and Colla (2013) suggest that a government in financial 
distress is more likely to “transfer risk” to corporates by increasing taxation, imposing foreign 
exchange controls, or expropriating private investments.  
Acharya et al. (2014) illustrate a strong relation between sovereign and banks’ risks. 
Deterioration in sovereign creditworthiness significantly triggers increases in banks’ risks not 
only because of their large holdings of government bonds but also due to the reduction in the 
value of government guarantees to banks. For example, in 2011-2012, numerous European 
banks were downgraded by CRAs who explained these downgrades by deteriorations in their 
governments’ financial capacities and willingness to bailout these entities. Moreover, the 
Committee on the Global Financial System (2011) highlights how the European sovereign 
debt crisis affected banks’ ability to raise funding. Collateral damage, risk aversion, and 
crowding-out effects are crucial channels via which deteriorations in sovereign 
creditworthiness strain banks’ funding conditions. The funding difficulties, in turn, force the 
banks to squeeze the credit supply for the economy and consequently threaten the prospects 
of the national economy (Gennaioli et al., 2014).  
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Another strand of literature presents evidence that sovereign credit rating actions are 
influential in many financial markets. Sovereign credit ratings are a major factor influencing 
sovereign yield spreads (e.g. Afonso et al., 2012). Generally, the impact of rating news in the 
debt market is asymmetric. Negative rating news imposes significant impact while the 
influence of positive actions is much more muted. Moreover, sovereign rating news spills 
over to other sovereign bond yields (e.g. Gande and Parsley, 2005; Arezki et al., 2011).  
Equity markets are also affected by sovereign rating news in a similar asymmetric 
manner. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) find that rating changes (on emerging sovereigns) 
affect the rated countries’ stock indices. Ferreira and Gama (2007) find that (S&P’s) 
sovereign rating changes of one country impose an asymmetric impact on the stock markets 
of other countries. Sovereign rating downgrades cause negative reactions whereas upgrades 
have no significant impact. Arezki et al. (2011) reveal that sovereign downgrades have 
significant spill-over effects not only across (European) countries but also across financial 
markets, i.e. sovereign credit default swaps (CDS), banking, insurance, and stock markets, 
during the period overlapping the European sovereign debt crisis. Alsakka and ap Gwilym 
(2013) find that both positive and negative credit news affects not only the rated country 
exchange rate but also spills over to other countries’ exchange rates. The market reactions 
vary across CRAs’ signals. 
For derivatives markets, prior literature on the impact of rating actions is restricted to 
examining the CDS market. Norden and Weber (2004) find significant increases in 
(corporate) CDS spreads in advance of negative (corporate) rating events implying that the 
CDS market anticipates negative rating events. Results for positive rating events are much 
less significant. Afonso et al. (2012) find that the CDS market reacts to negative sovereign 
rating events while the reaction to positive events is much more muted. Additionally, rating 
downgrades seem to be anticipated by the CDS market.  
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The above issues suggest that strong economic linkages exist between sovereign rating 
actions and equity market performance and thus market-wide volatility. However, the 
relationship between sovereign ratings and equity options (or implied volatility) has been 
ignored by prior literature. We address a gap in knowledge about the relative information 
content from the two sources.  
Given the prior evidence on the economic links between sovereign risk and uncertainty 
of the national economy, sovereign rating announcements are expected to impact market 
participants’ risk expectations. However, the option market (or implied volatility) will not 
necessarily react to negative (positive) rating news in a negative (positive) direction like other 
financial markets, as evidenced in e.g. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), Gande and Parsley 
(2005), Ferreira and Gama (2007), Arezki et al. (2011). Beber and Brandt (2006, 2009) reveal 
that scheduled macroeconomic news always reduces financial market uncertainty regardless 
of whether the news is more negative or more positive compared to prior expectations.4 The 
higher ex-ante uncertainty over the content of the macroeconomic news, the larger the drop in 
the market uncertainty when the news is released.  
Of course, credit rating news is not scheduled. However, market participants often 
consult with multiple CRAs (e.g. Cantor et al., 2007; Bongaerts et al., 2012). Therefore, it is 
rational for investors to expect actions from the other CRAs after a rating announcement from 
a ‘first mover’ CRA. We, thus, expect variation in the market reaction across CRAs. Prior 
literature also shows that there are variations in other market reactions to rating news released 
by different CRAs (e.g. Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2013). 
The option market is typically inhabited by institutional, informed traders (e.g. 
Chakravarty et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2005; Jin et al., 2012). Derivative markets also play a 
                                                          
4 While Beber and Brandt (2006) employ the second moment of option-implied state-price-densities to proxy the 
(US Treasury) market uncertainty, Beber and Brandt (2009) use (US T-bonds, S&P 500 index, Eurodollar, 
stocks) options-implied volatilities. 
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leading role in the price discovery process (e.g. Blanco et al., 2005; Acharya and Johnson, 
2007; Avino et al., 2013). Sovereign credit issues are less opaque to observe compared to 
those of corporate, banks and other issuers. Therefore, the market reactions of implied 
volatility to sovereign rating signals could be in either positive or negative directions. 
 
3. Data 
This study is based on an unbalanced panel dataset which covers 24 countries during 
the period from January 2000 to April 2012. The availability of traded stock index options 
determines the sample size and sample periods, i.e. we include all countries with data 
available for stock index options, except for 5 countries without any rating actions during the 
options sample period (Canada, Malaysia, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland).5 Table 1 lists the 
countries and the sample periods.  
 
3.1. Credit ratings 
Rating information is collected from Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch publications. This 
dataset consists of daily observations of long-term foreign-currency credit ratings, outlook 
and watch status of sovereigns rated by these three leading CRAs. Fig. 1 presents the 
distribution of daily ratings of sovereigns for each CRA. None of the 24 sovereigns were 
rated lower than BBB- (Baa3) by S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s during the sample period. About 
60% of the daily observations are in the triple-A rating category, and 2%-5%, 4%-7% and 
around 3.5% are at AA+/Aa1, AA/Aa2 or AA-/Aa3 rating categories. These proportions 
reflect the developed nature of the sample countries, which obviously coincides with the 
development of liquid stock index option markets.  
                                                          
5 Greece is excluded due to very low trading volume for stock index options. Options on Portugal PSI 20 and 
Ireland ISEQ were not traded during the sample period. 
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We convert sovereign ratings to numerical scores within a 31-point comprehensive 
credit rating (CCR) scale in order to capture information on both actual ratings and 
outlook/watch procedures. On the CCR scale, rating symbols are converted as follows: 
AAA/Aaa ≡ 31, AA+/Aa1 ≡ 28, AA/Aa2 ≡ 25 ... BBB-/Baa3 ≡ 4, lower than BBB-/Baa3 ≡ 1. 
Adjustments for (positive/negative) outlook and watch announcements are made by adding 
±1 and ±2, respectively, on the CCR scale.  
There is non-linearity in the rating scale, which means that the differences between 
rating levels are not equal. For example, a downgrade from AAA to AA+ or a downgrade 
from the investment grade to the junk grade have different implications to a downgrade from 
A to A-. Historical observations on default rates across rating categories also suggest such 
non-linearity (see e.g. IMF, 2010 and many others). In order to control for this, we employ a 
logit-transformation of the rating scale, constructed as follows: 








CCR
CCR
LCCR
32
ln  
Prior literature has used a logarithm transformation of the rating scale (e.g. Alsakka and 
ap Gwilym, 2013), but their transformation is different to ours. Their transformation gives the 
highest weight for rating changes on AAA and near bankruptcy issuers and the lowest weight 
for rating changes near the investment-speculative boundary. In contrast, our transformation 
gives greatest weights for rating changes on AAA and those near the investment-speculative 
threshold.  
There are several reasons why we adopt this particular log-transformation of the rating 
scale. Firstly, the speculative threshold is considered as very critical among rating users. For 
example, the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940 restricts pension funds and 
municipalities to the investment-grade range. Insurance firms also rely heavily on assets with 
investment-grade ratings because regulatory capital reserves increase significantly for 
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speculative assets (Campbell and Taksler, 2003). The speculative threshold is one of the most 
critical concerns to investors (e.g. Cantor et al., 2007; Bongaerts el al., 2012). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assign more weight to rating changes around this threshold. Secondly, there is 
no rating observation lower than BBB- during the sample period. Thirdly, it is reasonable that 
rating changes at the top of the scale are also given more weight (e.g. as evidenced by the 
reactions to sovereign downgrades of France, UK, and USA in 2011-2013). 
Outlook and watch signals are defined as follows. Negative watch signals include 
placing a sovereign on watch for possible downgrade and withdrawing watch status for 
possible upgrade (without an actual upgrade). Positive watch signals include placing a 
sovereign on watch for possible upgrade and withdrawing watch status for possible 
downgrade (without an actual downgrade). Negative outlook signals include changes to 
negative outlook from stable/positive outlook, and changes to stable outlook from positive 
outlook (without any rating change). Positive outlook signals include changes to positive 
outlook from stable/negative outlook, and changes to stable outlook from negative outlook 
(without any rating change). During the period, there are 13 (29), 10 (16), 9 (19) positive 
(negative) outlook announcements for the sample countries made by S&P’s, Moody’s, and 
Fitch, respectively. The corresponding figures of watch actions are 11 (11), 9 (11), and 3 (3) 
(see Table 2). 
Table 2 presents the sovereign credit rating events for each CRA. In total, there are 78 
(126) positive (negative) rating events released by the CRAs during the sample periods for 
the selected sovereigns. S&P released the most rating news with 33 positive and 56 negative 
signals. There are 26 (39) positive (negative) rating announcements by Moody’s while the 
figures are 19 (31) by Fitch. Almost all of the rating events are “clean” i.e. are not followed 
by same direction rating signals from other CRA(s) within at least 1 week. There are only 12 
rating events which involve more than one CRA taking action on the same sovereign within 
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one week. This is in support of the view that each CRA has its own policy on rating 
timeliness and rating stability (e.g. Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010).6 
The majority of rating events are single, whereby they do not involve both a rating 
downgrade/upgrade and outlook or watch signals, simultaneously. There are only 2/65 rating 
events made by Moody’s, and 1/50 by Fitch which are such multiple-rating events. S&P have 
released no such multiple-rating events during the sample periods. The majority of rating 
events are also within 3-point signals in the CCR scale which mean an outlook or watch 
announcement or a 1-notch downgrade/upgrade in isolation. There are only 3/89 rating events 
made by S&P, 6/65 by Moody’s, 3/50 by Fitch which are multiple-notch 
downgrades/upgrades. 
 
3.2. Implied volatility 
Data on 30-day call option- implied volatility (IV) upon the countries’ stock indices is 
collected from DataStream. The primary sources of data on premium, strike price, and 
maturity of the call options are the exchanges where these options are traded. The IV is 
estimated via the Black-Scholes model (for European style contracts) and the Cox-Ross-
Rubinstein binomial model (for American style contracts). An interpolation is calculated 
based on four series of call option contracts: two nearest to at-the-money and two nearest to 
30-day maturity. We use at-the-money contracts to mitigate the effects of skewness and 
smile.7 Also, the 30-day maturity means that the IV estimates short-term expected volatility 
which coincides with the short-term horizon of the rating watch procedure. 
There are 35,683 daily observations of 30-day implied volatility. Fig. 2 presents the 
distribution of the IV. During the sample periods, there are 315 observations where IV is 
                                                          
6 Market participants value both rating accuracy and stability. Rating stability is appreciated by many market 
participants, especially regulators, pension funds, mutual funds who often follow passive investment strategies. 
In these cases, a precisely accurate but wildly volatile rating system induces unbearably high transaction costs. 
7 Prior studies show that IVs are usually much higher for deep in the money and deep out of the money option 
contracts compared to at-the-money contracts, and this is known as the “smile” pattern. 
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greater than 100% in Hungary (14/01/2003-16/6/2003), Poland (7/2001, 10-11/2001, 2-
8/2002, 11/2002), and Russia (10/2008-4/2009). All (most) of these observations are 
associated within 1 month to at least one observation of absolute value of the underlying 
index return larger than 1% (3%). 54% of the observations are associated with at least one 
observation of absolute value of the index return larger than 10%. There were nine rating 
signals on the three sovereigns during these periods. Therefore, we do not exclude these 
observations in order to avoid possible information loss. Moreover, equivalent empirical 
investigations based on excluding the 315 observations produce qualitatively similar results 
(discussed further in Section 5).  
Our main interest is in the dynamics of the IV, and Fig. 3 presents the distribution of 
daily changes in the IV. The changes are very much centred around zero with a mean of 
0.0000451, median of 0, and standard deviation of 0.031.8 
 
4. Hypotheses and methodological framework 
4.1. Hypothesis I: Influence of rating news in the option market  
 H0: Credit rating news does not impose a discernable influence on the option market. 
Therefore, changes in the IV around any type of rating event are not statistically different 
from zero. 
In this stage, we use a standard event study. The event window is one week before 
and after rating events in order to mitigate any information contamination. Three intervals are 
defined as [-5, -1], [-1, 1], [1, 5]. t=0 denotes the day when a rating announcement is released. 
The [-1, 1] window is chosen rather than [0, 1] in order to control for any time zone issue.9 In 
addition, we only include clean events which are not followed or overlapped by rating 
                                                          
8 We exclude 23 observations of the daily ∆IV whose absolute values are greater than 50%, accounting for 
0.067% of total observations.  
9 Please note that our [-1, 1] window is equivalent to [0, 1] in other studies which examine financial assets 
returns because an asset return for day 0 incorporates information on the asset’s prices in day -1 and day 0. 
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announcement(s) on the same sovereign by another CRA(s) within at least 1 week in order to 
further avoid information contamination.10 With such a short distance in time (i.e. one week), 
it is highly plausible that two (or more) CRAs are reacting to the same underlying credit 
issue. Rating signals from different CRAs are pooled together in order to increase the 
numbers of events and hence the power of the testing procedure.11  
Prior literature shows that the option market is efficient and there is no significant 
evidence of forecastability of implied volatility. Konstantinidi et al. (2008) use numerous 
economic indicators in several econometric models in an attempt to forecast the evolution of 
US and European option implied volatilities, but none of these variables is significant and the 
adjusted R2 values of all the models are very near to zero. Moreover, out-of-sample 
forecasting evidence mostly favours the random walk model for evolution of the IVs. Jiang 
and Tian (2012) also support the random walk hypothesis for modelling the implied volatility 
extracted from S&P 500 index options. Therefore, we examine changes in the IV instead of 
modelling an abnormal element in the changes.12 
In order to avoid any possible bias due to the distribution of the sample mean of the 
∆IV due to the limited numbers of rating events, non-parametric tests are employed as 
robustness checks. The non-parametric tests are sign- and Wilcoxon tests, testing whether the 
medians of the ∆IV during the time windows are significantly different to zero. 
 
 
 
                                                          
10  Only for this event study, we exclude 12 ‘unclean’ rating events (mentioned in Section 3.1). Later 
investigations are based on all rating events. 
11 We are aware that the market reaction might vary across CRAs. The potential for varying reactions is 
examined by later methodologies. 
12 We also conducted Durbin-Watson and Breusch-Godfrey tests for the random walk of IVt in our sample. For 
most countries, the null hypothesis that IVt follows a random walk is accepted. The exceptions are Austria, 
France, Japan, Russia, Taiwan and USA. Results are available on request.  
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4.2. Hypothesis II: Varying impact across CRAs’ actions 
 H0: The impact of rating signals on the option market is similar across CRAs.  
Varying market reactions to rating news from different CRAs are reported in the 
literature (e.g. Bongaerts et al., 2012; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2013). The following 
regression is estimated: 
              ∆IVi, s = α + β* ∆LCCRi, t + γ*CCR i, t + θ*Co + ψ*Y + εi,t                    (1) 
∆IVi,s represents changes in the implied volatility for sovereign i during time windows s 
around credit signals from each CRA. Time windows are restricted to 3 months before- and 
after- credit signals. Specifically, [-66, -22], [-22, -5], [-5, -1] capture the market movements 
preceding rating news by 3 months, 1 month and 1 week, respectively; [-1, 1] conveys the 
market movements when rating news is released; [1, 5], [5, 22], [22, 66] capture market 
movements after rating news during 1 week, 1 month, 3 months later.  
ΔLCCR measures the sovereign credit signals, representing the 1-day change in the 
log-transformation of the CCR for sovereign i at event date t. CCR is the comprehensive 
credit rating from each CRA, which is included as an explanatory variable to control for 
macroeconomic news and other fundamentals of the rated sovereigns (e.g. Prati et al., 2012; 
Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2013). As macroeconomic and other fundamentals are determinants 
of sovereign ratings, the inclusion of ratings, in addition to country and year dummies, helps 
control for the likelihood that IV might be more volatile in countries with weak 
macroeconomic conditions. Thus, including CCR reduces any potential omitted variable bias.  
Co and Y are full vectors of country and year dummies. For each country and year in 
our data, we define one dummy variable. In total, there are 24 country dummies and 13 year 
dummies (2000-2012). 
Estimations of Eq. (1) are based on event days plus a country-matched random 
sample, drawn from the full sample after excluding non-event observations within the time 
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windows around rating events, in order to mitigate rating clustering and market noise issues 
(see Ferreira and Gama, 2007).13 It is noteworthy that the sample consists of observations on 
non-consecutive days that may be very distant from each other.  
In order to consider varying impacts across CRAs’ actions (if any), we estimate Eq. 
(1) for each CRA separately. For each CRA, there are three separate estimations for different 
types of signals (i.e. actual rating, outlook, watch announcements) in order to investigate the 
asymmetric market behaviour (if any). For ease of interpretation, the absolute value of 
∆LCCR is used.  
Furthermore, we perform Monte Carlo experiments as robustness checks by repeating 
the country-matched random sampling 10,000 times. Each time, our sample consists of a 
number of event observations plus the same number of random non-event observations. 
Based on this sample, regressions for the CRAs are run and the averages of estimated 
coefficients across the 10,000 times are reported (see Gande and Parsley, 2005). 
 
4.3. Hypothesis III: Causality between sovereign rating and IV 
 H0: Neither sovereign rating actions nor IV changes cause changes in the other variable.  
Given the leading role of derivatives markets (Blanco et al., 2005; Acharya and Johnson, 
2007; Jin, et al., 2012; Avino et al., 2013), we expect some evidence that the option market 
leads rating actions. Nonetheless, the lead-lag relationship between the market and ratings 
assigned by different CRAs could be different since the timeliness and policies of each CRA 
are not necessarily the same. 
Granger causality tests in a panel framework are conducted by estimating separate 
regressions of changes in the IV and sovereign ratings, as follows: 
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13 Equivalent estimations based on the full sample produce qualitatively similar results (available upon request). 
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 (k=5, 22, 66) 
∆IVi,t denotes daily changes in IV. Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Konstantinidi et 
al., 2008), we find that ∆IV is stationary. We employ Augmented Dickey-Fuller, KSS 
(Kapetanios et al., 2003) and KPSS (Kwiatkowski, et al., 1992) tests for stationarity in the 
context of individual time series. In addition, existence of a unit-root in the context of panel 
data is tested using procedures proposed in Im et al. (2003). The results (available upon 
request) from all the tests are in line with each other and strongly support the view that ΔIV is 
globally stationary. 
∆CCR denotes daily changes in the comprehensive credit rating from a given CRA 
(note that there are limited numbers of rating events during the 12-year sample period). We 
use ∆CCR instead of ∆LCCR to avoid any possible bias in the lead-lag relationship in the 
middle of the CCR scale (see Afonso et al., 2012), but we provide further evidence on this in 
Section 5.3. We are interested in the question of whether there are significant market 
movements prior to rating news or not.  
Z is a vector of fundamentals that affect ratings and implied volatility. However, given 
the fact that daily observations are not available for all the fundamentals, we restrict ΔZ to 
contain stock market returns14 (daily log returns of the underlying indices) and changes in 
CCR from the other two CRAs. Firstly, it is reasonable to include equity markets in models 
examining the lead-lag behaviour between the option market and credit rating signals due to 
the fact that the equity market and the option market both play roles in the price discovery 
process (e.g. Chen et al., 2005). Given the well-known leverage effect, the stock index return 
helps control for the fact that credit ratings and the option market do not adjust at the same 
frequency. Secondly, including lagged values of ratings from other CRAs controls for the fact 
                                                          
14 The stock market returns are stationary during the sample period. 
17 
 
that both the market participants and CRAs are aware of previous ratings from other CRAs. 
Market participants usually consult with multiple ratings (e.g. Cantor et al., 2007; Bongaerts 
et al., 2012). There is also evidence of interdependence between CRAs’ sovereign ratings 
(Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010). Therefore, it would be naïve to assume that either the 
market participants or CRAs are unaware of previous rating actions from other CRAs. 
Equations (2) and (3) are estimated by the fixed effects technique rather than the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM technique due to several reasons. Firstly, there are very 
large numbers of observations for each country. The bias in estimated coefficients of lagged 
values of dependent variables should be close to zero. Secondly, GMM relies on asymptotic 
theory and requires a large number of individuals (N), but N=24 in our sample. Moreover, 
GMM would imply taking the differences of the differences of ratings, IV, and equity returns 
which would amplify the noise in the regressions. It should be borne in mind that the 
frequency of rating changes is much less than those of the market indicators. Taking second 
differences would lead to two consequences which in turn amplify market noise. Firstly, the 
gap between the frequencies and variability of rating changes and those of market indicators 
(i.e. IV and stock returns) would be amplified. Secondly, the leverage effect would be 
neutralized. In testing the possible causality, we employ log-likelihood tests of the joint 
significance of all coefficients of lagged values of the IV in Eq. (2) and ratings in Eq. (3). 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Influence of sovereign rating news in the option market  
Table 3 presents the results of the event study. Panel A of Table 3 demonstrates an 
asymmetric pattern in the market reaction to rating signals. Specifically, there are significant 
responses to rating downgrades while the market impact of upgrades is muted. These 
reactions are confirmed by each testing procedure. Within a week following downgrades, the 
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IV on average reduces by 2.4 percentage points. This is similar to findings in prior literature 
on the impact of rating signals in other markets in the sense that upgrades generally do not 
trigger significant reactions from financial markets (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002; Gande 
and Parsley, 2005; Ferreira and Gama, 2007). However, the reduction in IV in response to 
downgrades is unexpected. Why does the option market consider an equity market in a 
recently downgraded country (i.e. a lower creditworthiness), to be less uncertain? One 
possible justification is that the market anticipates credit problems in advance and rating 
downgrades might serve as means of confirming the market anticipation (see Beber and 
Brandt, 2006). However, there is no evidence that upgrades and downgrades are anticipated 
by the market within the prior week. Rating upgrades (downgrades) might be anticipated 
further in advance. Increasing the length of time windows could answer the question. 
However, this approach encounters a rating clustering problem and reduces the number of 
(clean event) observations, hence, the power of the tests. The later methodology relaxes this 
constraint.  
Results from rating outlook signals are presented in Panel B of Table 3. There is no 
evidence that positive outlook signals induce market reactions. For the negative outlook 
signals, the non-parametric tests present significant evidence that the IV on average decreases 
by 1.3 percentage points within the subsequent week. Again, the IV reduces in response to 
negative rating news. The reaction is not immediate but within a short period. The evidence 
supports the previous conjecture about the confirmation effects of rating news.  
Panel C of Table 3 presents results from rating watch signals. The IV significantly 
increases by 1.6 percentage points at the time of both positive and negative watchlist signals. 
The response to negative watch news is short-lived while the market seems to overreact to 
positive watch announcements, i.e. the IV reduces by 2.5 percentage points during the 
following week. Although outlook and watch are monitoring procedures, watchlist is a much 
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stronger statement and CRAs aim at a short-term horizon in resolving the watch status. This 
contributes to explaining the greater relevance of watch announcements to 30-day IV. 
One interesting remark on Table 3 is that only watch announcements trigger immediate 
market responses. The responses are of the same sign, i.e. IV increases, regardless of the sign 
of watch announcements. In contrast, downgrades induce positive (but not immediate) market 
reactions, i.e. IV decreases, implying a confirmation effect of actual rating changes. The 
results suggest that the information content of rating signals for the option market depends on 
signal types rather than whether they are positive or negative.  
 
5.2. Varying responses to CRAs’ signals 
Tables 4 to 6 report the estimated coefficients of Equation (1) examining changes in IV 
during the time windows around rating signals from each CRA. The variable of interest is 
‘ΔLCCR’, representing the 1-day change in the log-transformation of the CCR scale of 
sovereign i at event date t. It should be noted that 1-unit changes in the CCR cause varying 
effects on the LCCR depending on the starting level of a sovereign rating. For example, 1-
notch downgrades on AAA sovereigns cause 1.488-unit decreases while 1-notch downgrades 
on A or A- sovereigns cause 0.379-unit decreases in the LCCR.15 Negative outlook (watch) 
signals on AAA sovereigns cause 0.726-unit (1.165-unit) decreases while equivalent signals 
on A or A- sovereigns cause much weaker responses in the LCCR. 
Table 4 shows that S&P rating news is influential in the market. The only time window 
where the coefficient of ΔLCCR is significant is [-1, 1]. This holds except for cases of 
positive watch announcements.16 The absence of significant coefficients during the other time 
windows implies immediate and short-lived effects of S&P’s rating announcements in the 
                                                          
15 There are downgrades/upgrades without prior outlook or watch signals. 
16 S&P never put a sovereign issuer on watch for possible upgrade during the sample period. All the positive 
watch actions in the S&P sample are confirming actual ratings after being on watch for possible downgrades.   
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market. Downgrades and upgrades impact the market in opposite manners. In cases of 
downgrades, the coefficient of ΔLCCR is significantly greater than zero implying that S&P’s 
downgrades trigger an increase in the IV. The magnitude of the increase depends not only on 
the magnitude of rating downgrades but also the current level of sovereign ratings. The IV, 
on average, increases by 3.8 percentage points in response to 1-notch downgrades on AAA 
sovereigns (1.488*0.0258). The IV decreases by 3.4 percentage points in response to a 1-
notch upgrade of a sovereign to AAA (1.488*0.0227).  
Negative outlook/watch announcements increase the IV while positive outlooks reduce 
the market uncertainty relating to rated sovereigns’ equity markets. The magnitude of the 
market reactions to positive outlook news is less than for negative outlook. In response to 
negative outlook news on an AAA sovereign, the IV increases 1.7 percentage points 
(0.726*0.0228). The reactions to negative watch signals are stronger, whereby the IV 
increases 2.5 percentage points (1.165*0.0216). Coefficients of CCR are generally 
insignificant, which infers that the current level of creditworthiness does not help to explain 
the dynamics of IV. In other words, the option market already subsumes current financial, 
macro-economic fundamentals of the rated sovereigns, which is consistent with the view that 
the evolution of implied volatility cannot be forecasted (e.g. Konstantinidi et al., 2008; Jiang 
and Tian, 2012). 
Table 5 reports the results of Equation (1) for Moody’s news. There are some 
statistically significant coefficients of ΔLCCR during the pre-event windows. However, it is 
problematic to interpret these as evidence of rating anticipation since the coefficients’ signs 
are not consistent with each other. For example, the IV decreases in advance of downgrades 
but increases prior to negative outlook/watch announcements. All the coefficients of ΔLCCR 
during the [-1, 1] time window are insignificant while those during the [1, 5] time window are 
all significant. The results imply that the market does not react immediately to Moody’s 
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rating news. The reactions come after Moody’s rating news is released, and in an opposite 
manner to the reactions to S&P signals. Moody’s downgrades trigger a decrease in IV while 
its upgrades trigger an increase. The IV decreases by 3.7 percentage points in response to 1-
notch downgrades on AAA sovereigns (1.488*0.0248). However, the IV increases by 9.2 
percentage points in response to 1-notch upgrades of sovereigns to AAA (1.488*0.0615). 
Other results are similar to Table 4. Specifically, coefficients of CCR are generally 
insignificant in explaining changes in IV and strong market reactions are found only during 
one time window. 
Table 6 reports the results of Equation (1) for Fitch. The results show that Fitch’s rating 
news has limited influence in the option markets. There is no significant evidence that Fitch 
rating signals trigger movements in the IV except for cases of downgrades. Here, the 
coefficient of ΔLCCR during the [-1, 1] window is significant and negative implying that 
Fitch’s downgrades induce a decrease in the IV. On average, the IV reduces by 3.3 
percentage points in response to 1-notch downgrades on AAA sovereigns (1.488*0.0222). In 
other words, Fitch’s downgrades reduce the market uncertainty. Results for CCR coefficients 
are very similar to those from Moody’s and S&P. 
Table 7 presents results of the Monte Carlo experiments. The results are strongly 
consistent with those from Tables 4-6. Overall, the market reaction varies across CRAs’ 
signals. There is no significant reaction to Fitch announcements while the reactions to rating 
signals from S&P are opposite to those from Moody’s. The only coefficient which is 
statistically significant in Panel A of Table 7 (reporting the market reactions to S&P signals) 
is of ΔLCCR during the [-1, 1] window. This indicates that S&P’s rating actions trigger 
immediate and short-lived responses from the market. The coefficient is negative meaning 
that S&P’s upgrades (downgrades), where ΔLCCR is positive (negative), significantly reduce 
(increase) IV during the [-1, 1] window. In contrast, the only coefficient which is statistically 
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significant in Panel B of Table 7 (for Moody’s signals) is of ΔLCCR during the [1, 5] 
window. The positive sign of the coefficient indicates significant increases (decreases) in IV 
following Moody’s upgrades (downgrades). 
In summary, there is significant evidence that sovereign credit rating signals induce 
reactions in the option market. There is also an asymmetric pattern in the market reactions. 
However, the asymmetry is not only between negative and positive rating news but also 
across CRAs. The influence of Fitch rating changes is less significant. This is consistent with 
Bongaerts et al. (2012) who reveal that Fitch plays a ‘tiebreaker’ role when there is a split 
between Moody’s and S&P around the investment-speculative threshold.17 All sovereigns in 
our sample are rated at investment-grade (by Moody’s and S&P), which could explain the 
limited impact of Fitch upgrades. The results for Fitch downgrades imply that even 
downgrades from the ‘tiebreaker’ do matter and reduce the market uncertainty. This leads to 
a possible argument that additional ratings are likely to reduce market uncertainty. To some 
extent, this is in line with Beber and Brandt (2006, 2009) who reveal that scheduled 
macroeconomic news always reduces market uncertainty (even when news is more negative 
than prior expectations). Of course, sovereign rating news is not scheduled. However, 
because market participants usually consult with multiple CRAs (e.g. Cantor et al., 2007; 
Bongaerts et al., 2012), it is rational for investors to expect actions from the other CRAs after 
a downgrade from a ‘first mover’ CRA. 
The results from Moody’s downgrades and S&P upgrades lend support to this 
argument. In our sample, all Moody’s downgrades followed S&P downgrade(s) on the same 
sovereign(s) except for downgrades of Hungary in November 2008. 18  Meanwhile, all 
                                                          
17 Bongaerts el al. (2012) is based on corporate ratings. Their decision to treat Fitch as the additional rater was 
based on the market shares. The market shares are similar between corporate and sovereign ratings. 
18 Moody’s downgraded Hungary on 07/11/2008 while S&P downgraded Hungary on 17/11/2008. However, the 
former action narrowed while the latter action widened the split between the two CRAs. Some S&P downgrades 
(on Austria, France, USA) were not followed by Moody’s within our sample periods. 
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Moody’s upgrades during the period led S&P upgrades on the same sovereigns. 19  This 
supports the view that S&P tends to lead in sovereign downgrades while Moody’s tends to be 
‘first mover’ in upgrades (e.g. Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010). This section has reported that 
Moody’s downgrades and S&P upgrades significantly reduce the market uncertainty. It is 
worth commenting that the reaction to Moody’s downgrades is found to be significant only 
during the [1, 5] window not the [-1, 1] time window. Moreover, the positive reaction is 
found after Moody’s negative news i.e. downgrades. This reaffirms the implication about the 
confirmation effects of actual rating actions, which was mentioned in Section 5.1. Actual 
rating changes (even downgrades) from CRAs who often lag in a specific type of rating 
action are likely to reduce the market uncertainty.  
In order to further clarify the argument, we re-specify our investigations by including 
dummies indicating whether a rating event widens or narrows the rating split between each 
pair of the CRAs. However, there is a lack of variation in the dummies indicating the split 
changes between Moody’s and S&P in each type of rating news, i.e. downgrades, upgrades 
(as analysed above). Therefore, it is only meaningful to re-specify the investigations on Fitch 
rating news. As previous results support Bongaerts et al.’s (2012) view that Fitch plays a ‘tie-
breaker’ role, the variable is constructed to consider the split between Fitch actual ratings and 
average ratings from Moody’s and S&P. The variable takes the value of 1 if Fitch signals 
reduce the split, -1 if Fitch signals widen the split, and 0 otherwise. The results are 
qualitatively the same as those in Table 6 (available upon request). The only difference is that 
the significance level of ∆LCCR in explaining ∆IV during the [-1, 1] window becomes 5% 
(instead of 10%). The coefficient of the variable is significantly negative at 5%. This result 
indicates that the market consults with Fitch downgrades in the wider context of Moody’s and 
S&P ratings. Implied volatility is reduced when Fitch downgrades reduce the disagreement 
                                                          
19 Some sovereigns experienced upgrades from only one of these two CRAs (Czech Republic, Finland, Israel, 
Korea). 
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between the CRAs about a sovereign’s creditworthiness. This reaffirms the implication about 
the confirmation effects of actual rating news in Section 5.1.  
Overall, these findings support the ‘information producing’ role of credit ratings both in 
the context of ‘first mover’ as well as additional ratings. Taken together, the results stress the 
importance of credit ratings, especially multiple ratings, because additional ratings are likely 
to reduce the market uncertainty. 
 
5.3. Lead-lag relationship between implied volatility and credit ratings 
Table 8 presents the results of Equations (2) and (3). The causality between movements 
of the option-implied volatility and sovereign rating signals varies across CRAs. There is 
highly significant evidence of relationships between S&P and Fitch signals and the option 
market. In contrast, Moody’s signals exhibit no causality in either direction.  
For S&P, the evidence that changes in IV Granger-cause sovereign rating news is 
stronger than that of the reverse relationship. ∆IV Granger-causes sovereign rating news for 
each lag length (i.e. within 1 week, 1 month, and 3 months). Meanwhile, S&P rating news 
only Granger-causes ∆IV for lags within 3 months. The findings are in line with prior papers 
researching rating anticipation by the CDS market (Norden and Weber, 2004; Afonso et al., 
2012) in the sense that rating changes could be anticipated by the derivative market.20 The 
results from Fitch demonstrate stronger implications (than from S&P) that movements of the 
IV Granger-cause rating news instead of vice versa. Specifically, there is no significant 
evidence that Fitch signals Granger-cause ∆IV even for lags within 3 months while there is 
significant evidence that ∆IV Granger-causes Fitch rating actions for lags within 1 month and 
within 3 months. However, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that either ∆IV or Fitch 
                                                          
20 We also estimate probit models testing whether movements in the IV prior to rating events are significant in 
explaining the probabilities of rating events. The results (available upon request) generally agree that (even) 
downgrades (from all the CRAs) could be anticipated by the option market.  
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signals leads each other in the very short-term, i.e. lags within 1 week. In general, the 
evidence for S&P and Fitch supports the view that changes in option-implied volatility help 
explain changes in creditworthiness of underlying entities which is, to some extent, consistent 
with prior papers (e.g. Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Cao et al., 2010).21 
There is no significant evidence of the causality or lead-lag relationship between ∆IV 
and Moody’s actions, even for lags up to 3 months. Among the CRAs, Moody’s explicitly 
provide details on the methodologies of their market implied ratings, e.g. Moody’s KMVTM 
which incorporates information from the option market. Therefore, it is hard to argue that 
Moody’s is unaware of the market movements. However, Moody’s actions are not following 
market movements. In other words, Moody’s ratings are tardy compared to those from S&P 
and Fitch. One logical explanation could be Moody’s following a policy of rating stability.  
In order to further clarify the above argument, we re-estimate Equations (2) and (3) 
based on information of actual rating changes and outlook/watch signals, separately. There is 
significant evidence that ∆IV Granger-causes Moody’s actual rating changes for lags up to 3 
months, but not vice versa. There is no significant evidence that either ∆IV or Moody’s 
outlook/watch signals Granger-cause each other for all lags. There is strongly significant 
evidence that both ∆IV and S&P outlook/watch signals Granger-cause each other for all lags. 
There is also strongly significant evidence that ∆IV Granger-causes Fitch outlook/watch 
signals, but not vice versa (results available upon request). The results imply that S&P and 
Fitch are likely to focus on rating accuracy while Moody’s results are consistent with a 
greater emphasis on rating stability.  
Furthermore, we conduct equivalent causality investigations using ∆LCCR (instead 
∆CCR) in Equations (2) and (3). The results (available upon request) are qualitatively 
different. Specifically, the null hypothesis that ΔIV does not Granger-cause ∆LCCR cannot 
                                                          
21 Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) use bond spreads while Cao et al. (2010) use CDS spreads. 
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be rejected (even at the 10% significance level). This is true except only for Fitch at lags k = 
66. Movements in the option market Granger-cause rating changes in the linear scale. 
However, this causality relationship is insignificant when the non-linearity of the rating scale 
is taken into account (i.e. there is no evidence that stronger movements happen prior to rating 
news on AAA-rated issuers or those rated near the speculative threshold). This implies that 
the market is aware of credit issues in advance of rating events, yet the magnitude of the 
credit issues remains uncertain, especially for issuers at the top and bottom of the investment-
grade spectrum. 
 
5.4. Discussion of results 
All sovereigns in our sample are rated at the investment-grade (by each CRA) and 
many of them are categorised as developed economies. Such economies are usually 
characterised by informational transparency, which contributes to the possibility that the 
creditworthiness of these sovereigns is likely to be observable by financial market 
participants. As a result, rating changes are more likely to be led by market indicators, such 
as IV. The results shed light on the price (credit quality information) discovery process. The 
causal relationships suggest that the process is not simply one way, but also cannot dismiss 
the importance of rating news. Credit rating signals (especially from S&P and Moody’s) 
significantly influence IV. 
An interesting question over the informational content of rating news can be raised. If 
the IV leads rating news, the informational content of the news would be subsumed in the IV. 
Therefore, there should be no reaction found on and/or after the announcements of the news. 
Nonetheless, reactions to S&P and Moody’s rating news are found to be significant (Tables 4, 
5, and 7). The result implies that a significant part of the informational content of rating 
signals remains until their announcements, even for those led by the option market. Along 
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with the finding that additional ratings are likely to reduce the market uncertainty, the results 
stress the importance and relevance of sovereign ratings to market sentiment.   
In order to check the robustness of our findings against extreme observations, we have 
also conducted equivalent empirical investigations based on excluding the 315 extreme 
observations (mentioned in Section 3.2). The results are qualitatively similar. Specifically, 
the findings of the event study and investigations of varying market responses to individual 
CRAs’ signals do not change. There are only two changes in the lead-lag investigations 
which do not alter our main findings and conclusions.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the interaction between the stock index option market and 
sovereign credit ratings assigned by Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch based on a dataset of 24 
countries, which covers all countries with liquid stock index options markets (except for 
countries without rating actions) during 2000 - 2012. The effects of rating signals are 
evidenced by an event study, and country-matched random sampling regressions. Robustness 
of the results is confirmed by non-parametric tests and Monte Carlo experiments. Granger-
causality tests are employed in order to detect any lead-lag relationships between rating 
actions and market movements. 
A unique contribution to the literature is made by (i) identifying differing influences of 
CRAs on market uncertainty; (ii) demonstrating the important role of additional sovereign 
ratings in reducing market uncertainty; (iii) providing evidence of a two-way relationship 
between sovereign ratings and the equity index option market. 
We find an asymmetric pattern in market responses not only between positive and 
negative events but also varying across CRAs. The market is more likely to react to news 
from S&P and Moody’s rather than from Fitch, consistent with Bongaerts et al. (2012) who 
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argue that Fitch plays a ‘tiebreaker’ role, at least in corporate ratings. Moreover, Fitch 
downgrades trigger a decrease in IV, implying that even downgrades from the ‘tiebreaker' do 
matter and reduce the market uncertainty. Furthermore, the market reactions to Moody’s and 
S&P signals reinforce the analysis that additional signals (both negative and positive) are still 
informative and reduce the market uncertainty. These stress the importance of multiple 
ratings and support the information production role of credit ratings in the context of both 
first-mover as well as subsequent rating news. The results are robust across methodological 
frameworks and specifications. In addition, we find significant causal relationships between 
market movements and all types of rating actions assigned by S&P and Fitch, but only actual 
rating changes from Moody’s. The finding indicates differences in the CRAs’ timeliness and 
policies. S&P and Fitch credit signals reveal a relatively stronger focus on rating accuracy 
while Moody’s emphasises rating stability. The finding also implies that market participants 
observe credit issues and react more quickly than CRAs. 
From these findings, it is not persuasive to argue that credit rating actions precipitated 
the European sovereign debt crisis, as was repeatedly suggested by some commentators. By 
the time of announcements, (even negative) rating actions can serve as a means of confirming 
the market anticipation and reducing market uncertainty. Some potential policy implications 
can be raised. The findings support the view of not “shooting the messengers” as expressed 
by the Association of British Insurers (House of Lords, 2011). In response to the recent 
crises, credit ratings have been under consideration for removal from regulations as well as 
investment guidelines. There are clearly benefits of reducing reliance on credit ratings, but 
proposals such as SEC (2011 a, b) deserve a caveat, particularly in the context of traditional 
debt ratings. A strong degree of heterogeneity exists in market responses to rating news, 
differing by signal, direction and CRA.  
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Table 1 
List of sample countries   
Country Period 
 
Country Period 
Australia 2010-2012 Israel 2010-2012 
Austria 2000-2012 Italy 2007-2012 
Belgium 2010-2012 Japan 2007-2012 
Brazil 2011-2012 Korea 2009-2012 
China 2007-2012 Netherlands 2000-2012 
Czech Republic 2002-2009 Poland 2000-2002 
Finland 2001-2012 Russia 2008-2012 
France 2001-2012 South Africa 2011-2012 
Germany 2000-2012 Spain 2007-2012 
Hong Kong 2007-2012 Taiwan 2010-2012 
Hungary 2002-2009 UK 2001-2012 
India 2010-2012 US 2002-2012 
 
The data set covers 24 countries. The availability of traded stock index options determines the sample 
size and sample periods, i.e. we include all countries during the periods that their stock index options 
are traded (except for Canada, Malaysia, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland who have not experienced 
any rating actions during the sample periods and Greece whose stock index option market is very 
small). 
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Table 2 
Rating events 
 
This table reports numbers of rating events released by the CRAs during the sample periods. Columns (1), (2), (3) report numbers of positive, negative, and 
total rating signals from S&P, respectively. Similarly, columns (4) to (9) report corresponding numbers from Moody’s and Fitch. (10) = (1) + (4) + (7); (11)= 
(2) + (5) + (8); (12)= (3) + (6) + (9).  
No. of events 
S&P Moody’s Fitch Total 
Positive Negative ∑ Positive Negative ∑ Positive Negative ∑ Positive Negative ∑ 
Column number (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Actual rating 9 16 25 7 12 19 7 9 16 23 37 60 
Outlook 13 29 42 10 16 26 9 19 28 32 64 96 
Watch 11 11 22 9 11 20 3 3 6 23 25 48 
Total 33 56 89 26 39 65 19 31 50 78 126 204 
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Table 3 
Results of the event study 
 
Time window [-5,-1] [-1,1] [1,5] 
 
[-5,-1] [-1,1] [1,5] 
Panel A: Actual rating changes 
 
Downgrade 
 
Upgrade 
IV  (%) -1.044 1.023 -2.434*  
-2.659 0.880 0.854 
p-val. of t-test  0.215 0.220 0.066   0.238 0.425 0.685 
p-val. of sign test 0.247 0.557 0.009   0.607 0.607 1.000 
p-val. of Wilcoxon test 0.163 0.174 0.029 
 
0.543 0.570 0.903 
No. of Events 27 
 
19 
Panel B: Outlook signals 
 
Negative outlook 
 
Positive outlook 
IV  (%) -0.719 1.383 -1.274†  
-0.955 0.618 -0.312 
p-val. of t-test  0.140 0.159 0.118   0.153 0.368 0.566 
p-val. of sign test 0.220 0.583 0.027   0.327 0.845 1.000 
p-val. of Wilcoxon test 0.199 0.227 0.011 
 
0.214 0.380 0.544 
No. of Events 57 
 
29 
Panel C: Watch signals 
 
Negative watch 
 
Positive watch 
IV  (%) -0.243 1.551* -0.382  
-0.028 1.567* -2.469** 
p-val. of t-test  0.760 0.067 0.706   0.963 0.051 0.017 
p-val. of sign test 0.541 0.064 0.838   0.523 0.286 0.000 
p-val. of Wilcoxon test 0.931 0.029 0.909 
 
0.592 0.040 0.003 
No. of Events 24 
 
22 
Only ‘clean’ events from all CRAs are used. IV  reports mean value of changes in the IV during the 
time windows in percentage points. Cases in bold denote significance at least at 10% level in both 2-
sided t-test and either of 2-sided non-parametric tests. *, ** denotes significant in t-test at 10%, 5% level 
of significance. † denotes significant in the non-parametric tests and not in the t-test. See Tables 1 and 2 
for details on the data sample. The reason for mis-matches in no. of events compared to columns 10 and 
11 of Table 2 is the absence of unclean events. 
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This table reports the results of estimations of Equation (1) with Huber-White robust standard errors. For the ease of interpretation, absolute value of ∆LCCR is used. 
p-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** denote significant at 10%, 5% level of significance. Country-matched random sampling from the full sample is used. See 
Tables 1 and 2 for details on the data sample.  
Table 4  
Estimation results of Eq. (1) for the S&P events 
 
Time window [-66, -22] [-22,-5] [-5,-1] [-1,1] [1,5] [5,22] [22,66] 
 
[-66,-22] [-22,-5] [-5,-1] [-1,1] [1,5] [5,22] [22,66] 
Panel A Downgrade 
 
Upgrade 
∆LCCR 0.0083 -0.0111 -0.0094 0.0258** -0.0006 -0.0070 0.0074 0.0766 -0.0215 0.0108 -0.0227** -0.0176 0.0050 0.0184 
 
(0.815) (0.620) (0.374) (0.035) (0.968) (0.758) (0.745) (0.405) (0.594) (0.383) (0.043) (0.104) (0.844) (0.912) 
CCR -0.0073 -0.0016 0.0014 0.0014 0.0018 0.0068 0.0007 -0.0062 0.0009 0.0013 0.00123 0.0013 0.0077* -0.0030 
   (0.109) (0.634) (0.591) (0.252) (0.258) (0.110) (0.883) (0.287) (0.806) (0.717) (0.378) (0.418) (0.096) (0.580) 
Year/ Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 23.80% 45.43% 7.65% 7.99% 10.93% 35.44% 0.78% 20.86% 44.81% 7.04% 8.96% 11.97% 35.47% 1.03% 
Panel B Negative outlook 
 
Positive outlook 
∆LCCR -0.05849 0.0216 -0.0103 0.0228* 0.0063 0.0055 -0.0483 -0.0096 0.0003 0.0081 -0.0161* -0.0046 0.0002 0.0068 
   (0.434) (0.558) (0.310) (0.056) (0.672) (0.828) (0.701) (0.790) (0.990) (0.444) (0.096) (0.785) (0.995) (0.796) 
CCR -0.0081* -0.0003 0.0010 0.0019 0.0017 0.0066 -0.0024 -0.0088* -0.0020 0.0019 0.00113 0.0019 0.0066 0.0001 
 
(0.087) (0.931) (0.745) (0.120) (0.292) (0.155) (0.664) (0.096) (0.591) (0.550) (0.312) (0.274) (0.167) (0.979) 
Year/ Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 21.04% 44.69% 7.71% 8.67% 9.39% 18.55% 0.95% 24.05% 45.47% 7.96% 13.09% 12.58% 40.33% 0.71% 
Panel C Negative watch 
 
Positive watch 
∆LCCR -0.07302 0.0276 -0.0194 0.0216* 0.0119 0.0042 -0.0381 0.0519 -0.0450 0.0022 -0.0171 0.0041 -0.0287 0.0594 
 
(0.518) (0.562) (0.139) (0.082) (0.501) (0.894) (0.848) (0.643) (0.337) (0.870) (0.298) (0.854) (0.355) (0.766) 
CCR -0.007 -0.0012 0.0017 0.0013 0.0016 0.0068 -0.0013 -0.0075 0.0007 0.0012 0.00159 0.0013 0.0071 -0.0036 
  (0.153) (0.746) (0.589) (0.268) (0.336) (0.147) (0.829) (0.146) (0.866) (0.674) (0.213) (0.406) (0.123) (0.584) 
Year/ Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 21.05% 44.75% 7.50% 8.70% 9.82% 34.30% 1.02% 21.07% 44.95% 7.21% 7.54% 10.08% 33.68% 1.05% 
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This table reports the results of estimations of Equation (1) with Huber-White robust standard errors. For the ease of interpretation, absolute value of ∆LCCR is used. 
p-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** denote significant at 10%, 5% level of significance. Country-matched random sampling from the full sample is used. See 
Tables 1 and 2 for details on the data sample.  
Table 5  
Estimation results of Eq. (1) for the Moody’s events 
 
Time window [-66, -22] [-22,-5] [-5,-1] [-1,1] [1,5] [5,22] [22,66] 
 
[-66,-22] [-22,-5] [-5,-1] [-1,1] [1,5] [5,22] [22,66] 
Panel A Downgrade 
 
Upgrade 
∆LCCR 0.0448 -0.0327** 0.0195 0.0019 -0.0248** 0.0101 0.0014 -0.9433 0.4813 -0.0707** 0.0106 0.0615** -0.0118 0.0112 
 
(0.105) (0.026) (0.131) (0.859) (0.037) (0.620) (0.945) (0.178) (0.119) (0.035) (0.333) (0.016) (0.761) (0.762) 
CCR -0.0015 -0.0021 0.0005 0.0006 0.0016 0.0029 0.0011 -0.0316 0.0122 -0.0005 0.0006 0.0024* 0.0028 -0.0003 
 
(0.607) (0.298) (0.702) (0.426) (0.102) (0.299) (0.767) (0.140) (0.205) (0.756) (0.478) (0.053) (0.374) (0.930) 
Year/ Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 34.72% 25.84% 6.86% 7.16% 7.61% 33.21% 1.02% 28.58% 49.56% 8.29% 7.02% 12.97% 32.98% 1.02% 
Panel B Negative outlook 
 
Positive outlook 
∆LCCR 0.4498 -0.2165 0.0372* 0.0029 -0.0371** 0.0118 -0.0078 -0.5782 0.2853 -0.0393 -0.0144 0.0412** -0.0110 -0.0182 
 
(0.194) (0.156) (0.078) (0.771) (0.023) (0.548) (0.742) (0.235) (0.190) (0.168) (0.116) (0.047) (0.669) (0.459) 
CCR -0.0186 0.0061 -2.2E-05 0.0007 0.0018* 0.0027 0.0009 -0.0207 0.0082 -0.0005 0.0007 0.0019* 0.0033 -0.0007 
 
(0.210) (0.351) (0.986) (0.373) (0.086) (0.318) (0.794) (0.216) (0.279) (0.715) (0.418) (0.085) (0.262) (0.856) 
Year/ Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 24.85% 46.93% 7.79% 7.06% 12.52% 33.33% 1.03% 25.46% 47.73% 7.84% 7.46% 12.93% 33.51% 1.05% 
Panel C Negative watch 
 
Positive watch 
∆LCCR 0.5181 -0.2685 0.0439* 0.0041 -0.0328* 0.0041 0.0137 -0.5241 0.2622 -0.0304 -0.0045 0.0285* 0.0053 0.0027 
 
(0.216) (0.160) (0.098) (0.711) (0.052) (0.860 (0.570) (0.242) (0.194) (0.209) (0.694) (0.093) (0.726) (0.932) 
CCR -0.0214 0.0084 -0.0003 0.0006 0.0018* 0.0030 -0.0004 -0.0159 0.0051 -0.0003 0.0007 0.0020* 0.7260 0.0004 
 
(0.202) (0.264) (0.846) (0.490) (0.098) (0.295) (0.918) (0.217) (0.382) (0.811) (0.367) (0.051) (0.346) (0.923) 
Year/ Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 25.28% 47.56% 7.84% 6.74% 11.82% 33.01% 1.02% 24.98% 47.13% 7.80% 6.98% 11.82% 33.36% 1.00% 
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This table reports the results of estimations of Equation (1) with Huber-White robust standard errors. For the ease of interpretation, absolute value of ∆LCCR is used. 
p-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** denote significant at 10%, 5% level of significance. Country-matched random sampling from the full sample is used. See 
Tables 1 and 2 for details on the data sample. 
Table 6  
Estimation results of Eq. (1) for the Fitch events 
 
Time window [-66, -22] [-22,-5] [-5,-1] [-1,1] [1,5] [5,22] [22,66] 
 
[-66,-22] [-22,-5] [-5,-1] [-1,1] [1,5] [5,22] [22,66] 
 
Downgrade 
 
Upgrade 
∆LCCR 0.0462 0.0425 -0.0124 -0.0222* -0.0108 -0.0107 -0.0254 0.0056 0.0275 -0.0282 0.0050 0.0056 -0.0604 0.0101 
 
(0.206) (0.341) (0.636) (0.062) (0.636) (0.607) (0.389) (0.886) (0.498) (0.267) (0.780) (0.705) (0.346) (0.877) 
CCR 0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0006 0.0014 0.0007 0.0061* -0.0007 0.0014 -0.0023 -0.0003 0.0019 0.0003 0.0071* 0.0003 
 
(0.825) (0.701) (0.796) (0.313) (0.655) (0.068) (0.895) (0.721) (0.450) (0.903) (0.206) (0.883) (0.066) (0.962) 
Year/ Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 20.92% 44.68% 7.34% 7.18% 9.66% 40.84% 0.78% 20.91% 44.70% 7.27% 7.49% 9.33% 33.89% 1.01% 
 
Negative outlook 
 
Positive outlook 
∆LCCR 0.0475* 0.0190 -0.0105 -0.0109 -0.0056 0.0243 -0.0480 -0.0694** -0.0425 0.0027 0.0119 0.0002 -0.0174 0.0176 
 
(0.099) (0.664) (0.657) (0.422) (0.764) (0.515) (0.164) (0.032) (0.373) (0.934) (0.413) (0.994) (0.546) (0.575) 
CCR -0.0005 -0.0015 -0.0003 0.0009 0.0005 0.0071** -0.0033 0.0018 0.0001 -0.0007 0.0020 0.0004 0.0071* 0.0001 
 
(0.884) (0.621) (0.885) (0.482) (0.770) (0.052) (0.526) (0.644) (0.963) (0.787) (0.194) (0.815) (0.068) (0.986) 
Year/ Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 20.97% 44.67% 7.81% 7.27% 9.46% 33.69% 1.03% 20.88% 44.99% 7.49% 7.74% 9.10% 42.31% 0.82% 
 
Negative watch 
 
Positive watch 
∆LCCR 0.0478 0.0298 0.0007 -0.0188 -0.0036 0.0244 -0.0353 -0.0469* -0.0238 0.0030 0.0115 0.0054 -0.0259 0.0389 
 
(0.120) (0.480) (0.978) (0.119) (0.840) (0.507) (0.276) (0.098) (0.570) (0.901) (0.367) (0.760) (0.472) (0.242) 
CCR 0.0008 -0.0017 -0.0008 0.0019 0.0007 0.0068* -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0014 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0005 0.0072** -0.0032 
 
(0.829) (0.592) (0.732) (0.182) (0.665) (0.072) (0.993) (0.959) (0.648) (0.906) (0.535) (0.745) (0.048) (0.547) 
Year/ Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 20.92% 44.65% 7.05% 7.60% 9.34% 33.49% 1.02% 20.93% 44.66% 7.04% 7.28% 9.53% 33.57% 1.02% 
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This table reports the averages across all 10,000 estimations of Equation (1) with Huber-White robust standard errors. Each estimation of the equation is 
based on one independent random country-matched sampling. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ** denotes significant at 5%. N reports maximum 
number of observations for one estimation as this number varies slightly between estimations. The estimated coefficients of CCR are not reported for ease of 
presentation. Different to Tables 4-6, we do not use absolute value of ∆LCCR here. See Tables 1 and 2 for details on the data sample. 
Table 7  
Results of the Monte Carlo experiment 
Time window [-66, -22] [-22,-5] [-5,-1] [-1,1] [1,5] [5,22] [22,66] 
Panel A: S&P rating news 
∆LCCR 0.0346 -0.0282 0.0111 -0.0202** -0.0058 0.0121     0.0207 
 
(0.322) (-0.443) (1.092) (-2.038) (-0.425) (0.581) (0.576) 
Year/Country dummies & CCR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 39.78% 42.11% 19.02% 12.62% 16.57% 30.53% 36.39% 
N 253 256 262 262 259 256 248 
No. of estimations 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 
Panel B: Moody’s rating news 
∆LCCR -0.3203 0.1994 -0.0291 -0.0042 0.0339** -0.0088 0.0038 
 
(-1.329) (1.381) (-1.592) (-0.438) (1.984) (-0.418) (0.167) 
Year/Country dummies & CCR Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 41.72% 43.37% 19.67% 11.80% 18.02% 29.86% 36.65% 
N 253 256 263 262 259 256 249 
No. of estimations 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 
Panel C: Fitch rating news 
∆LCCR -0.0428 -0.0207 0.0128 0.0111 -0.0024 -0.0196 0.0301 
 
(-1.219) (-0.457) (0.575) (0.968) (-0.154) (-0.568) (0.880) 
Year/Country dummies & CCR Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 39.92% 41.82% 18.73% 12.03% 16.29% 29.94%   36.61% 
N 254 256 263 262 259 256 249 
No. of estimations 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 
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Table 8  
Results of log-likelihood tests of causality between rating actions and implied volatility 
 
This table reports the results from log-likelihood ratio tests after estimations of Equations (2) and (3). LR reports the log-likelihood ratio from the tests of null 
hypothesis that ∆IV (Rating actions) do not cause Rating actions (∆IV). p-val. reports the p-values from the tests. **, *** denote significance at 5%, 1% 
levels. See Tables 1 and 2 for details on the data sample. 
 
Null hypothesis  
 
Null hypothesis  Null hypothesis  
k = 5 
i.e. lags 
within 1 
week 
∆IV does not cause 
S&P actions 
LR-val. 11.09** ∆IV does not cause 
Moody’s actions 
LR-val. 3.75 
 
∆IV does not cause 
Fitch actions 
LR-val. 6.88 
p-val. 0.0495 p-val. 0.5853 p-val. 0.2299 
S&P actions do not 
cause ∆IV 
LR-val. 7.71 Moody’s actions do not 
cause ∆IV 
LR-val. 7.87 Fitch actions do not 
cause ∆IV 
LR-val. 4.02 
p-val. 0.1730 p-val. 0.1637 p-val. 0.5470 
    
 
  
k = 22 
i.e. lags 
within 1 
month 
∆IV does not cause 
S&P actions 
LR-val. 50.60*** ∆IV does not cause 
Moody’s actions 
LR-val. 20.02 ∆IV does not cause 
Fitch actions 
LR-val. 44.73*** 
p-val. 0.0005 p-val. 0.5818 p-val. 0.0029 
S&P actions do not 
cause ∆IV 
LR-val. 30.13 Moody’s actions do not 
cause ∆IV 
LR-val. 10.85 Fitch actions do not 
cause ∆IV 
LR-val. 11.02 
p-val. 0.1153 p-val. 0.9769 p-val. 0.9744 
    
 
  
k = 66 
i.e. lags 
within 3 
months 
∆IV does not cause 
S&P actions 
LR-val. 107.90*** ∆IV does not cause 
Moody’s actions 
LR-val. 80.46 ∆IV does not cause 
Fitch actions 
LR-val. 108.38*** 
p-val. 0.0009 p-val. 0.1087 p-val. 0.0008 
S&P actions do not 
cause ∆IV 
LR-val. 116.17*** Moody’s actions do not 
cause ∆IV 
LR-val. 45.7 Fitch actions do not 
cause ∆IV 
LR-val. 51.56 
p-val. 0.0001 p-val. 0.9732 p-val. 0.9037 
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Fig. 1: Distribution of daily rating observations.  
Moody’s symbols (i.e. Aaa, Aa1, Aa2 ... Baa3) are categorised in equivalent S&P and Fitch ratings 
categories (i.e. AAA, AA+, AA, ... BBB-). The dataset covers 24 countries during the period from 
January 2000 to April 2012. We include all countries with traded stock index options, except for 5 
countries without any rating actions during the sample periods (Canada, Malaysia, Norway, Sweden 
and Switzerland) and Greece whose stock index option market is very small. 
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Fig. 2: Daily observations of 30-day maturity implied volatility.  
The dataset covers 24 countries during the period from January 2000 to April 2012. There are 35,683 
daily observations of 30-day implied volatility. Among them, there are 315 observations where IV is 
greater than 100% in Hungary (14/01/2003-16/6/2003), Poland (7/2001, 10-11/2001, 2-8/2002, 
11/2002), and Russia (10/2008-4/2009). All (most) of these observations are associated within 1 
month to at least one observation of absolute value of underlying index return larger than 1% (3%). 
54% of the observations are associated with at least one observation of absolute value of the index 
return larger than 10%. These were periods of turbulence in the three countries. There were nine 
rating signals on these three sovereigns during the periods.  
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Fig. 3: Distribution of daily changes in 30-day implied volatility.  
The dataset covers 24 countries during the period from January 2000 to April 2012. There are 115 
observations where ∆IV is more than 20%. All (most) of them are associated within 1 month to at 
least one observation of absolute value of underlying index return larger than 1% (5%). 
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